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Agricultural tariff rate quotas in the EU 1997-2002:
Do developing countries enjoy quota rent?
Cathie Laroche Dupraz and Alan Matthewsl
Abstract
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were introduced and legitimised as a market access instrument in
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). TRQs combine both restrictions on
imports, as well as safeguarding current or preferential agricultural trade flows. When market
access is restricted by a high tariff level beyond the quota, exporters that enjoy the low in-
quota tariff may be able to gain a share of the quota rent. Do developing exporting countries
benefit from EU TRQs? Are quota rents or the guaranteed market access the more important
gain from the operation of these TRQs? What interests should developing counfries defend in
the debate on TRQs in the WTO Doha Round agricultural negotiations?
This paper analyses the implementation of 87 EU agricultural TRQs between 1997 and 2002
to examine their economic significance from the point of view of developing countries.
Analysis of the database shows that TRQ ffade can generate a high preference margin but that
the potential rent is not so high. Moreover, this potential rent is concenffated on bananas and
sugar, because TRQs are actually binding for those two commodities. More detailed analysis
of those products indicates that only a few exporting countries are likely to enjoy this
potential rent: Latin American countries for bananas and ACP countries for sugar. Whether
developing country exporters benefit from this potential rent depends on their competitiveness
relative to world market prices as well as on the market conditions which determine whether
rent is collected by the exporting country or by the importer.
Keywords: Tariff rate quotas, quota rent, developing countries
1 Département d'économie rurale et gestion, AGROcampus Rennes; Trinity College Dublin, Ireland.
Emails: laroche@agrocampus-rennes.fr; alan.matthews@tcd.ie. This work was (in part) financially supported by
the "Agricultural Trade Agreements (TRADEAG)" project, funded by the European Commission (Specific
Targeted Research Project, Contract no. 513666). The authors are solely responsible for the contents of this
paper.
1. Introduction
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have been introduced and legitimised as a market access instrument
in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (I-IRAA). The motivation behind this
instrument was to guarantee minimum level of market access and to safeguard current levels
of access in the face of the high MFN tariffs which resulted from tariffication. 1371 TRQs
were notifiedby 37 countries to the WTO as a result of the Uruguay Round (G/AGAIG/5/7).
TRQs constitute a double tariff system: a low level tariff (t) is applied to imports up to the
quantitative limit established by the quota Q; beyond the quota, a higher level tariff (T) is
applied to imports. Thus, TRQs combine both restriction of imports, and the safeguard of
cunent or preferential agricultural trade flows. When market access is restricted by a high
tariff level beyond the quota, exporters that enjoy the low in-quota tariff may be able to gain a
share of the quota rent. Do developing exporting countries benefit from EU TRQs? Are quota
rents or the guaranteed market access the more important gain from the operation of these
TRQs? What interests should developing counfries defend in the debate on TRQs in the WTO
Doha Round agricultural negotiations?
This article analyses the implementation of 87 EU agricultural TRQs between 1997 and2002
to examine their economic significance from the point of view of developing countries.
Section 2 discusses some theoretical aspects of the economics of TRQs, in order to introduce
the empirical work. Section 3 briefly presents the database built and used to analyse the
implementation of the EU's agricultural TRQs during the period 1997-2002. The potential
total rent that one can theoretically expect from TRQs is calculated, by product and export
country groupings. Section 4 focuses on those product groups, bananas and sugar, which
generate the highest potential rent, and discusses the extent to which developing country
exporters benefit from these rents. Section 5 concludes.
2. Tariff rate quotas, import market access and quota rent
The standard analysis of TRQs assumes that the importing country is small with respect to the
world market and takes account of only one source of imports, thus ignoring the possibility of
the specific allocation of TRQs to particular exporters (see Figure 1). In this analysis, the unit
quota rent corresponds to the difference between the in- and over-quota tariffs (T 
- 
t), if the
quota is entirely filled and there are out of quota imports (case 4). If there are no over-quota
imports but the quota is entirely filled, then the unit quota rent depends on the import price
(case 3). In this framework, there is no rent if the quota is not entirely filled (cases I and?).
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Figure 1. - Standard TRQ diagram, from Skully (2001)
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Laroche Dttpraz and Matthews (2005) extended this framework by analysing what happens
when the restrictive assumptions behind the standard analysis are relaxed. In this more
realistic analysis, the importing country is large, there may be several groups of suppliers
characterised by different levels of exporting costs, and TRQs may or may not be specifically
allocated to one or another group. They show that a variety of situations may occur, which
give a better understanding of the creation of quota rent under TRQs. Figures 2 and 3 aim to
gradually build up the graphical framework used to show the role of rents in this more
complex analysis. Note that we assume in this analysis that the quota rent accrues to the
exporting counffy. In practice, the division of the quota rent between the importer and
exporter depends on a variety of factors, including the market sffucture and the manner of
allocating the licences for in-quota imports.
Figure 2 
- 
Price formation in a tariff quota import market, no specific quota allocation
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Figure 2 indicates that two groups of overseas suppliers are distinguished: import demand D
faJes the supply 5,MFn+enr tirri.rt is the horizontal sum of S,Pm unJS,^, the èxport supplies
of preferred areas and other areas (subject to the most favoured country (MFN) regime),
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respectively. One of them, S,Pre, is assumed relatively more high cost than the other.
However, given the way the diagram is drawn, both groups supply the import market. Under a
simp^l^e_tariff t, total imports are q; market shares are allocated between preferred suppliers, up
to qr"*, and MFN 
"ountri"r, 
at the level q,MN. The world price is p.
We now introduce a global quota Q. Compared to the previous non quota situation, the world
price is depressed from p to p'. If there is no specific allocation of the TRQ, both groups
continue to supply the import country and the price obtained for in-quota sales is increased
from p to pu.There is no over quota supply under the assumption that T is prohibitive for both
suppliers at the import price pa-.]4FN and PRE countries do enjoy the quota rent up to their
respective export quantities g2,w and q11Pre, at the unit rent tèvèt 1pa I p'), represented by
the grey area.
Figure 3 
- 
Price formation in a tariff quota import market, specifÏc quota allocation to
preferred exporting countries, non binding quota
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In order to guarantee a better access specifically to the prefened group, the importing country
might want to open a bilateral quota. In the case of an allocated TRQ, import demand D flrst
faces the preferred country export supply, and only the residual demand faces the MFN
country export supply. Residual demand is denoted by Dnrs = ) - S,Pre. figure 3 illustrates
two alternative scenarios. In scenario (1), the over-quota tariff T1 is prohibitive for MFN
exporters and S,Pm^is not competitive enough to fill the entire TRQ: Q,tE < Q. Although the
import price is prQ, certainly higher tharr the world price, there is no rent for preierred
exporters. They nevertheless enjoy a gleater export surplus than they would without a
specifically allocated TRQ, represented as the grey hiangle. In scenario (2), the over-quota
tariff T2 is not prohibitive. MFN exporting countries are able 
^to compete with preferred
countries despite the over-quota tariff T > t. The import price_p:a is depressed compared to
the situation without over-quota imports because Qrn* < Q,tm. Thero is no rent âtttrough
there are over-quota imports. Compared to scenario (1), the export surplus of preferred
countries is now smaller. This observation illustrated the risk of preference erosion for
preferred suppliers in the case where the over-quota tariff T is reduced.
A third scenario is represented in Figure 4. It occurs if Q is binding for StPm. In this third
case, preferred suppliers enjoy both export surplus and quota rent due to the specific
allocation of TRQ. The residual demand curve addressed to MFN supply is drawn parallel to
J
total import demand when the quota is entirely filled. One can then measure the unit quota
rent value for preferred suppliers if it exists. It clearly depends on the export costs of preferred
exporting countries (grey rectangle) and is not exactly equal to (T - t) (black arrow).
Figure 4 
- 
Price formation in a tariff quota import market, specific quota allocation to
preferred exporting countries, non binding quota
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Several other cases are possible depending whether the quota Q is binding or not, the MFN
supply is competitive or not at tariff T, etc. But the analysis highlights the difference between
quota rent enjoyed by competitive suppliers when a TRQ is binding, and preferential export
surplus that can occur for preferred suppliers, with or without rent, when an allocated TRQ
gives them a preferential market access to the importing country, protected from foreign
competition. This analysis highlights the risk of overestimating the quota rent, if this is
calculated as the unit difference between in- and over-quota tariffs (T 
- 0. The assessment of
the economic welfare gains for exporters closely depends, first, on the price competitiveness
of the exporter that enjoys the in-quota reduced tariff t. The higher price on the quota-
constrained market takes the form either of a rent or of a simple export surplus gain. Second,
it depends on the method of TRQ allocation. A specific bilateral allocation guarantees a
welfare gain to the beneficiary, protected from international competition. These results have
different implications for the negotiation positions of exporting countries in the WTO.
In the light of this enlarged framework, this article purposes an empirical investigation to look
after EU implementation of agricultural TRQs upon the last years, and identify the cases
where TRQs either generate rents or only assure at least an market access to less competitive
countries, indeed a guaranteed export surplus due to specific allocation of TRQ.
3. Implementation of EU agricultural TRQsr1997-2002
A database of EU TRQs had previously been constructed for the years 1997 to 1999
(Matthews and Laroche, 2001). This database is extended in this paper to include the
available data from more recent years: 2000 to 2002. Data on the use of TRQs beyond 2002
have not yet been notified by the EU to the WTO. Of the 91 TRQs the EU notified on its
WTO schedule, 87 were in force during the period analysed: 44 current access (CA), 38
4
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minimum access (MA) and 6 non tariffied quotas.2 14 of the 44 CA TRQs are bilaterally
allocated, while 18 MA TRQs include CEEC access. Although globally TRQs account for
less than l07o of the total value of agricultural imports, several products, such as manioc,
maize, sugar or bananas, are essentially imported into the EU through this particular
instrument. Some exporting countries clearly depend on this instrument for their EU market
access. CA and MA in-quota tariffs were significantly reduced between 1995 and 2000 due to
URAA implementation. Note that there are TRQs not notified in the WTO schedule, such as
those which are granted in the framework of EU preferential agreements with particular
countries such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Lomé and
Cotonou Agreements. Thus the quota for "ACP traditional quantities of bananas", for
example, which is similar to the EU TRQs allocated to ACP banana exporters, is not notified
as such. Also, the EU has added new TRQs since then, including for example compensation
to exporters hurt as a result of the latest EU enlargement. In this paper, we focus on the
original 87 TRQs as these are the most important.
Each TRQ covers one or, more often, several products defined at the HS8 (Harmonized
System 8 digit) tariff code level. For every notified TRQ, annual AMAD3 and WTO
notifications give in and out of quota tariffs, as well as fill rates. The Eurostat COMEXT
external trade database gives, for each commodity defined at the HS8 level, the EU import
level (volume and value) as well as the origin of imports. The constructed TRQ database
provides information, for each HS8 commodity and for each origin of import, on (i) the in-
quota import level, (ii) the quota fill rate, (iii) potential rent level. Because a TRQ often
covers several HS8 commodities, and because also one HS8 commodity may appear in
several separate TRQs, constructing the information on points (i) and (ii) of the database
required the following assumptions :
The dishibution of HS8 commodity imports between several TRQs is assumed
proportional to the relative size of each TRQ concerned,
The global fill rate of a TRQ is assumed to apply to each HS8 commodity composing
the TRQ,
The distribution of import origins for each HS8 tariff line covered by a TRQ follows
the global distribution of imports under that HS8 line (for example, in the case where
there are over-quota imports and thus TRQ imports make up only a part of total
imports under that tariff line), except if a specific allocation has been stated in the
notification. In that case, the distribution of TRQ imports between origins respects
first the specific allocations.
Concerning point (iii) of the database construction, i.e., the evaluation of quota rents, the
previous graphical analysis highlighted the difference between what we would call the
"pteference margin" (PM = T - t), which is the potential rent which would occur only if a
TRQ is actually filled, and the effective rent, which depends on the relative competitiveness
of export supplies on the import market. Figure 5 makes the point about each stage of rent
evaluation. In our database, the potential preference margin (PPM = Q*G-t)), actual
preference margin (APM 
- in-Q * G-t)) and potential rent (PR = APM if in-Q >90 7o Q) are
2 In tlris paper, all agregated data from 1997 to 2U)2 do not take into account TRQ 87 (rum) because data upon this TRQ are
only available for period 2O00 to 2002.
3 The Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD) is a cooperative effort among Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, EU
Commission, DG Agriculture, OECD Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, UNCTAD, TRAINS Database
unit, UN FAO, Commodities and Trade Division, and USDA, Economic Research Service. to provide a common dataset
on agricultural tariffs, TRQs and imports. See www.amad.org for further details.
a
a
a
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systematically calculated for each tariff line covered by a TRQ. The transformation into
effective rent and its allocation between importers and exporters has not been attempted in
this paper. We nevertheless begin such an evaluation in a number of case studies described in
Section 4.
Figure 5 - From the potential preference margin to the effective rent
Potential preference margin : (T 
- 
t)*Q
rRQ not nued / Actual preference'""E-fi;i#;i, 7o or more)
I por.r,#."ni
No rent
But export
surplus? Developing countries are
competitive suppliers
Effective rent = notential rent
\'
\r
Developing countries are not
competitive suppliers
Effective rent < potential rent
Effective rent
I
TRQ licence allocation procedures
Rent accrues to importer Rent accrues to exporter
A further stage in building the database was to synthesise the data by regrouping HS8 results
to HS4 and HS2 levels, and to aggregate exporting countries into groups (developing
counffies, ACP, LDCs, by regional areas...), in order to make the overall results easier to
follow and to broad magnitudes of TRQ implementation effects. While results are available
on an annual basis, the following tables report averages for the period 1997-2002.
Table 1 gives, for each commodity group, the relative importance of TRQ imports in total EU
imports. One can observe that the share of TRQ imports in total imports is large especially for
meat, dairy, sugar and fruits.
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Table 1: Relative importance of TRQ imports by commodity group in EU imports
Average 1997-2002
Live animals and meat
Dairy
Fruit, vegetable and nuts
Tropical products
Cereals and milling products
Oils and Oilseeds
Sugar and sugar confectionery
Other processed foods & drink
Total
lotal
irnports
ol wtrich :
lrnports ot
HS8
products
covered by
TRQs
(2)
m€
2 198
642
3 785
0
1 585
0
883
783
I 876
As per
cent of
total
Potential
value ot
TRO
imports
As per
cent ol
iotal
lmpofis
Actual
value of
TBO
irports
(1)
m€
3 069
817
12 595
6 667
6 960
16 022
2 503
27 847
76 481
(3) 
= 
(2)/ (1)
72%
79%
30%
0%
23%
0o/o
35%
3%
13%
56%
1o/o
72"/o
33"/"
25o/o
3o/o
60"/o
15"/"
63%
(4)
m€
1 938
1 212
2340
0
476
0
795
306
6 051
t6)
m€
1 508
551
1 715
0
544
0
1 150
195
5 664
{5)=(4)/(1}
63%
148%
19o/o
0%
ao/t/o
0%
32%
1%
8o/o
Cereals
and
mllllng
producb
4%
10/t/o
51o/"
4o/o
13"/"
1"/"
11%
2%
As per ratio of
cenlol acfualto
total potential
imports TRQ
imports,
i.e. lill rale
(4=(6)/(1) {8)=(6)/(4)
vo%
49% 7go/o
67% 460/o
14% 73%
0% na
8% 114%
0% na
46% 145%
1% 64%
7% 94%
Table 2 shows, for each country group, the relative importance of TRQ imports in total EU
imports. Note the significant share of TRQs in total sugar, meat and dairy imports from ACP
countries and fruits and vegetable imports from Latin American and Asian countries.
Table 2: Country group TRQ shares as a ratio of their total trade for each commodity
group
Average 1997 -2002
Total
Total LDC non ACP
Tota| LDC ACP
TOTAI ACP NON LDC
Total non LDC Asia
Total non LDC Latin America
Total non LDC Maghreb, Middle Est
Total developing countries
Total developped or in transition countries
Live
animâls
and meat
Frults,
vogelablss
and nuts
Othet
ptoc6ssêd
loods
TotalDairy
Oo/o
Oo/o
Oo/o
o%
Oo/o
Oo/o
0o/o
Oo/o
1o/o
Sugar
34"/o
61o/o
75%
97o/o
2o/o
32o/o
1o/o
41"/"
8/o
54o/o
1o/o
9o/o
52"/"
5%
620/o
1o/o
45%
59%
18o/o
Oo/"
Oo/o
1o/o
46Y"
39"/"
1o/o
24o/o
7o/o
2o/o
4%
1 1o/o
ao/I/O
8o/o
1o/o
8o/o
20/
Figures 6 and 7 report the distribution of preference margin and potential rent respectively
between commodities and exporting countries.
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Figure 6: Distribution of preference margin and potential rent between commodity
groups, 1997 -2002 average
(l,
ooo
q)
4 000
3 500
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2 500
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1 000
500
0
Live
animals and
meat
Totâl LDC
non ACP
Dairy Fruit,
legetables
and nuts
Cereals and Sugar
milling
products
Other
processed
products
Total
Total
I Actual preference margin I Potential rent
There is a large difference between the calculated potential preference margin (total PPM : 4.4
million euro), actual preference margin (total APM : 3.6 million euro) and the potential rent
(total PR : 2.4 million euro). The potential rent is concentrated on a few commodities:
essentially fruits and vegetables and sugar. Note that, for sugar, there is no significant
difference between the potential rent and potential preference margin: sugar TRQs are in
practice binding.
Figure 7: Distribution of preference margin and potential rent between country groups,
1997-2002 average
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3 000
2 500
2 000
1 500
1 000
500
0
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Total LDC
ACP
Total ACP
non LDC
Total non
LDC Asia
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Amêrica
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LDC
Maghreb,
Middle Est
Total
developped
or in
trans ition
countries
Total
developing
countries
E Actual preference margin I Potential rent
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A first look at this figure indicates that virtually all of the potential rent created by TRQs
accrues to developing countries (under the maintained working assumption that rent is
collected by the exporting country). However the distribution of this potential rent across
supplier countries is very uneven. Most potential rent accrues to Latin American and ACP
countries. LDC's, while Asian and the Maghreb countries do not benefit to any significant
extent from the rent created by TRQs.
The database results presented in this section give broad magnitudes of the effects of TRQs
for exporting countries by country and commodity grouping. But they often hide particular
commodity or exporting country situation. In Section 4 we focus on a few commodities which
account for a high proportion of the potential rent, in order to elaborate, for those particular
products, the consequences of TRQ implementation for developing exporting countries.
4. The cases of Fruits and Vegetables and Sugar
Fruits and vegetables and sugar are the two commodity groups which account for most of the
potential rent accruing from the EU's agricultural TRQs. Do these EU TRQs give effective
rent to exporters?
4.1. Fruits and vegetables
Disaggregating this commodity group to the more detailed HS4 level, Table 3 indicates that
the main part of the fruits and vegetables preference margin comes from bananas (manioc
may also be important, but the large difference between PPM and APM for code 0714
suggests that the fill rate is not sufficient to give rise to significant effective rent). In other
words, although TRQs in the fruits and vegetable sector seemed, at first glance, to create an
important source of rent for developing countries, in fact, only a small group of countries
actually share this rent and then only for one product: bananas.
Table 3: Distribution of TRQ preference margin between fruits and vegetables
HS4
code )escription
Potential
preference
mmein €m
Actual
preference
margin 
€m
1701 )otatoes, fresh or chilled 0,1 0,1
)706
)anots, tumips, salad beetroot, salsify, celeriac, radishes and similar edible roots, fresh ol
:hilled 0,0 0,0
)70'7 :ucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled 0,5 0,4
J709
other vegetables, fresh or chilled (excl. Potatoes, tomatoes, alliaceous vegetables, edible
brassicas, lettuce "lactuca sativa" and chicory...) 0.0 0,0
)7 ll
vegetables provisionally preserved, e.g. by sulphur dioxine gas, in brine, in sulphur water or in
cther preservative solutions... 8,2 {o
)712 lried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder, but not further prepared 0,8 0,8
)7 t4
manioc, arrowroot, salep, Jerusalem artichokes, sweet potatoes and similar roots and tubers
with hieh starch or inulin contents... 649,8 289,3
)802
Ither nuts, fresh and dried, whether or not shelled or pelled (excl. Coconuts, brazil nuts anc
:ashew nuts) 7,r 5,1
)803 )ânanas, incl Plantains, fresh or dried 1405,8 1405,9
c805 :itrus fruits, fresh or dried 7.6 4,6
t806 Erapes, fresh or dried 0,3 0,3
t808 rpples, pears and quinces, fresh 0,4 0.4
1809 rpricots, cherries, peaches incl. Nectarines, plums and sloes, fresh I,4 0,4
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Figure 8: Distribution between developing countries of potential rent accruing from
fruits & vegetables and sugar TRQs' average 1997-2002
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r Fruit, vegetables and nuts r Sugar
Figure 8 confirms, as observed earlier, that potential rent in the fruits and vegetables sector
accrues to Latin American countries. That is consistent with the allocation rules of the
bananas TRQ which is reserved for Latin American banana imports. This particular TRQ is
very well known because it has been at the core of a long dispute in the WTO between EU
and exporting firms of Latin American bananas, (WTO, 1997 a & b), which wanted to be sure
that TRQ import licences would be allocated only to them. Various studies show that rent
seeking was an important goal for banana exporting firms and countries, as attested by the
active quota licences market between flrms.
Figure 9: Evolution 1997-2002 of the preference margin for Fruits and Vegetables
3 000
2 500
2 000
g15oo
:
1 000
500
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
--- Potential preference margin (m€) --r- Actual preterence margin (m€)
The fruits and vegetables preference margin follows a negative trend over time due to the
reduction in the out-of-quota tariff resulting from the implementation of the Uruguay Round
Agricultural Agreement: potential rents accruing from TRQs decrease with time until 2000.
For example, the banana TRQ tariff T decreased from 750 to 680 €/t, while the in-quota tariff
t stayed at the 75 €lt level. A relative stabilisation may be observed in 2001 and 2002. Note
that the gap between the potential and actual preference margin does not come from the
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bananas TRQ which is systematically entirely filled, but from other fruits and vegetables (see
Table 3). The unit quota rent in that case does not reach the value of the unit preference
margin (T-t) because the out-of-quota tariff is prohibitive (no out-of-quota imports). However,
the recurrent dispute at the WTO to redishibute the rent suggests that the rent level is high.
On 1 January 2006, the European Union introduced a new import regime for bananas,
removing the TRQ and setting the MFN tariff equal to 176 €/t, while also applying a duty-free
quota reserved for imports from ACP countries (which is comparable to the previous regime)
and expanding the EBA initiative for bananas (Anania, 2006).In other word, the banana TRQ
has been eliminated, and with it, the major source of agricultural TRQ potential rent for Latin
American exporting countries.
4.2. Sugar
Figure 8 shows that the sugar TRQs' potential rent essentially accrues to ACP countries. That
is consistent with the allocation rules for these TRQs. Three TRQs are open in the sugar
sector, as described in Table 4. TRQ37 (cane or beet sugar), which is the main TRQ on sugar
sector, allocates 10 000 t to India, with the rest reserved for ACP countries. Note that other
preferential arrangements also exist in the sugar sector which are not notified as TRQs under
the WTO ageement, including the arrangement for Special Preferential Sugar which is meant
to ensure that the Maximum Supply Needs of EU cane refineries can be met.
Table 4 : TRQs notified in the EU sugar sector
This remunerative market access for ACP countries is granted as a result of bilateral trade
agreements i.e., the sugar protocol of the Lomé Convention, continued by the Cotonou
Agreement. This particular market access guarantees that the EU buys the specified amounts
at a price related to the intervention price for EU sugar in return for an obligation to supply on
the part of the ACP suppliers. But, do sugar TRQs give an effective rent to ACP countries?
TRO Description HS Code Ouantitv (t)
TRO37 Cane or beet sugar t'tol r 304 700
TRQ38 Raw cane sugar 17011 I 10 85 463
1701 1 190
t70r12t0
t70t1290
17019100
17019950
TRO39 Chemicallv pure fructose 17025000 4 504
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Figure 10: Evolutionl99T-2002 of the preference margin for Sugar
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
---.-Potential preference margin (m€) +Actual prelerence margin (m€)
Figure 10 shows that, for sugar, the potential and actual preference margins are equal: the
TRQs are entirely filled. As for fruits and vegetables, the sugar preference margin decreases
from 1997 to 2000 because of out-of-quota tariff reduction. This trend is reversed in 2001 and
2002 where we observe a small increase in the preference margin. This is due to an increase
in TRQ38 imports from Central European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic...)
and especially of commodity 17019950 which has a higher unit preference margin compared
to the other commodities of TRQ 38.
Because the sugar TRQ guarantees ACP countries a price related to the EU market price,
which is significantly higher than the world market price, it might be assumed that the sugar
TRQs create rents for ACP exporters. However, this cannot be concluded with certainty. It is
theoretically possible that ACP countries are just competitive enough to export sugar at the
EU price, like StPre in the situation described in Figure 3. To establish that the sugar TRQ
generates a rent and not only export surplus would require information on the costs of
production of ACP sugar exporters. This development to calculate effective rent is not
attempted in this paper.
Since 2002, in line with the Cotonou Agreement, EU and ACP countries have begun to
negotiate new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), in order to substitute a reciprocal
and WTO-compatible trade agreement for a non-reciprocal one. The benefits of the sugar
protocol are not directly threatened because the EPA negotiations require that the trade
advantages for ACP counhies must be protected in the new sugil regime. But the extension of
the EBA initiative to the sugar sector after 2009 and the promised simplification of rules of
origin may lead to the fransformation of the TRQ into a simple differentiated tariff regime
according to origin (MFN versus ACP or LDC countries), on the banana model. This would
undoubtedly have adverse effects on some ACP sugar producers which would then face
greater competition from other preferred developing countries, and particularly the least
developed countries. The consequences for ACP countries will also depend on the EU market
price under this new regime which will determine the future volume of exports and thus the
size of any export surplus earned on those exports. Further reform of the EU sugar regime,
leading to the elimination of production quotas, will require a further reduction in EU sugar
prices, which will further reduce the gains which ACP now earn from the sugar TRQs.
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5. Conclusion
This paper presents results from the construction of a detailed database of TRQs implemented
in the EU at the HS8 tariff line level from 1997 to 2002 and subsequently aggregated by
countries and commodities. Combining both tariff gaps and quotas, TRQs are usually
expected to procure rents to countries which export in-quota. The examination of 87 EU
TRQs in place from 1997 to 2002 shows that, while the preference margin is potentially high
for TRQs as a whole, the potential rent is lower. Moreover, this potential rent is mainly
concentrated on bananas and sugar, because TRQs are binding for those two commodities. As
a result, only a few exporting countries are able to enjoy this potential rent: Latin American
countries for bananas and ACP countries for sugar.
The analysis of potential rent is only the first step in quantifying the overall importance of
TRQs to developing countries. Two further steps are required to convert this into effective
rent. The first step would examine the extent to which preferred exporters are competitive at
world market prices. The higher the costs of production of preferred exporters relative to the
world price, the lower the effective rent they enjoy, although some of this lost rent is replaced
by the export surplus enjoyed on in-quota exports which would not materialise in the absence
of the TRQ. The second step would examine the extent to which this effective rent is collected
by the exporting country or by firms or other agents in the importing country. This is
determined in part by the way in which licences for the limited volume of in-quota imports
are allocated, as well as the competitive structure of the market.
Latin American exporters are highly competitive suppliers, and this trade does generate
significant rents, as evidenced by the series of challenges under WTO rules to the way the EU
administers the import licences for Latin American bananas. The situation for ACP sugar
exporters is somewhat different. Here, the guaranteed market price paid to exporters ensures
that rent, where it exists, accrues to the exporting countries. On the other hand, many ACP
sugar exporters, particularly those in the Caribbean, are not competitive at world market
prices and much of the benefit of the potential rent is dissipated in higher costs of production.
In both cases, reform of the market regimes is likely to reduce the significance of any rents
which do accrue to developing country exporters over time. Where TRQs are replaced by
preferential tariff-only regimes, as in the case of bananas, there is the possibility of
maintaining preferential treatment through different levels of tariffs according to origin,
removing any rent seeking behaviour of exporters. But, if the MFN tariff is subsequently
decreased as a result of liberalisation agreements, this presents the risk of preference erosion
for less developed countries (as happened to ACP countries in the case of bananas).
Information on the negotiating positions in the V/TO Doha Development Agenda indicate that
TRQs are likely to survive into the future, and may even increase in importance linked to the
treatment of sensitive products in the market access pillar. For example, if the EU opts to
designate a number of tariff lines as sensitive, this would require the infroduction of new
TRQs or the enlargement of existing ones. Early drafts of the negotiating modalities suggest
that these would be opened on a global, non-discriminatory basis and would not allocate
specific amounts to preferred beneficiaries. Depending on their trading position (competitive
exporter versus less competitive one), the evolution of TRQ rules may have different
consequences for the export markets of different groups of developing countries.
13
Glossary of Abbreviations
ACP : African Caribbean Pacific
AMAD : Agricultural Market Access Database
CEEC : Central and Eastern European Countries
EPA : Economic Parbrership Agreements
EU : European Union
LDC : Less Developed Counfries
TRQ : Tariff Rate Quota
MFN : MostFavoured Nation
WTO : V/orld Trade Organisation
URAA : Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
TRQnotation
Q : Size of the quota
t : In-quota tariff
T : Out of quota tariff
APM : Actual Preference Margin
PPM : Potential Preference Margin
HS8, HS4 : Harmonized System 8 digits, 4 digits
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